Mark Sykes, the British Arabists and the Enduring Consequences of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by Comaratta, Nicholas
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate
Journal of History, Series II
Volume 20 Article 10
2015
Mark Sykes, the British Arabists and the Enduring
Consequences of the Sykes-Picot Agreement
Nicholas Comaratta
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives
Part of the History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Historical
Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information,
please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Comaratta, Nicholas (2015) "Mark Sykes, the British Arabists and the Enduring Consequences of the Sykes-Picot Agreement,"
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II: Vol. 20 , Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol20/iss1/10
Sykes-Picot Agreement 97
Mark Sykes, The British Arabists and
the Enduring Consequences of the
Sykes-Picot Agreement
Nicholas Comaratta
Introduction
The ongoing actions of the Islamic State (ISIS) in
Syria and Iraq are motivated by both religious and
political conditions which exist as a result of drasti-
cally irresponsible foreign diplomacy conducted by
both Great Britain and France nearly a hundred years
ago. In a viral video declaring the establishment of
their Islamic Caliphate in the summer of 2014 entitled
End of Sykes Picot, the Islamic militants of ISIS ex-
pressed their goal to reverse the territorial lines
established by the Sykes Picot Agreement of 1916.1 By
the end of the summer, many geo-political analysts
speculated that the group's recent advances in North-
ern Iraq and at the Turkish-Syrian border had in fact
destabilized the existing borders which were drawn in
the agreement.2
The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a deal negotiated
between the British, French and Russian Empires in
anticipation of the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the
end of World War One. The agreement effectively split
the Middle East (which had been under Ottoman Rule
      1 The End of Sykes Picot, (ISIS. 2014. Syria: Youtube,
February 26th, 2015).
      2 Worth, Robert. “Redrawn Lines Seen as No Cure in Iraq
Conflict,” The New York Times. (New York, NY), June 26, 2014.
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for nearly four hundred years) between the three
nations; Britain would maintain control over modern
day Iraq, and France the region of modern day Syria
and Lebanon. While Russia was originally partitioned
a small section of land north of Iraq, their zone was
delegitimized by the collapse of their Imperial state and
the rise of the Bolsheviks in 1917. Nevertheless, the
boundaries drawn in the agreement would eventually
be used in the post-war formation of the mandate
system in the Middle East under the League of Na-
tions.3 
Mark Sykes represented the British Empire in the
negotiations with French ambassador Georges-Picot.
Sykes, an imperialist minded member of the Tory
Party, had a wide range of personal experience in the
region and expressed his views on the local religions
and tribal-political dynamics through travel writings as
well as his own personal letters. While Sykes was for
the most part religiously tolerant, he still held many
racial and cultural prejudices which played into his
final decision making process. In addition to these
biases, he was convinced the Arabs were incapable of
self-rule and he therefore sought to continue the
advancement of the British Empire by maintaining its
influence in the Middle East. These imperialist ideals
combined with Sykes' disposition to lie and withhold
pertinent information made him absolutely unfit to
draw a map deciding the fate of the Middle East in the
twentieth century and beyond. 
Sykes' negotiations virtually ignored the proposals
      3Karabell, Zachary. Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East
and North Africa, (2 vols. New York: Macmillian Reference USA,
2004), 2128.
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made by a group of scholar administrators from
Mesopotamia known as the British Arabists. These
men and women were members of the British foreign
service or media who worked almost exclusively in the
Middle East and developed strong self-determination
ideologies through their direct experiences with the
local culture and people. Most notable of these British
Arabists were T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell and
along with other prominent figures they petitioned for
the British Empire to move forward with a policy
supporting independence in the Middle East in order
to avoid future conflict in the region. 
Ultimately the voices of Lawrence and Bell were
silenced by the machinations and deliberations which
dominate international politics and the borders drawn
by Sykes-Picot were effectively recognized during the
San Remo Conference of 1922 through the League of
Nations mandate system.4 Had more influential
members of the British government sympathized with
their policies, the post-war borders drawn for the
Middle East may have been more sensitive to the
cultural and religious variations which complicated the
politics of the region. By ignoring the sympathetic
opinions of the British Arabists, the Sykes-Picot
Agreement of 1916 was clouded by the imperialist
leaning ideologies and prejudices held by Mark Sykes
and thus altered the trajectory of Middle Eastern
society and politics in the twentieth century in a way
which still motivates militant groups such as ISIS.
This paper will examine the background of the
agreement as well as the men and women involved in
the establishment of Britain's policy in the Middle
      4 Karabell, Encyclopedia, 2128.
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East. Drawing mainly upon the discussion of the
Sykes-Picot Agreement from Lawrence in Arabia by
Scott Anderson as well as “British Scholar Administra-
tors in Iraq” by F.S. Naiden, it will attempt to place the
effects of the accord into a more modern context
focused around the contemporary events carried out
by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. By looking at
the personal works of Sykes, Lawrence and Bell it will
seek to better understand the backgrounds and
experience which played a role in forming their ideas
and aspirations for the future of the Middle East.
Ultimately, this paper will seek to compare the pro-
posed maps drawn by T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell
with Sykes’ map in order to understand the fundamen-
tal problem of Sykes and Picot.
Background: Leading up to the Treaty
By 1915 the Allied powers in World War One had
witnessed vast amounts of unimaginable devastation
across the European landscape. In a conflict motivated
by imperial rivalries, Britain’s and France’s final
objectives shifted towards consolidating concessions
and post-war reparations after only one year of blood-
shed.5 Both Britain’s and France's post-war imperial
ambitions included inhibiting their aggressors in order
to prevent future conflict as well as securing new
provinces "as though to compensate for the loss of an
entire generation in Flanders."6 
Seeking provinces, they naturally turned to where
      5 Anderson, Scott. Lawrence in Arabia, (New York, USA:
Random House, 2013), 151-152.
      6 Alaric, Jacob. "The British Arabists," History Today. 23,
no. 5 (1973) : 323.
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any empire looks to expand: lands inhabited by people
and societies they deemed inferior. No region was more
ripe for a transition of power than the dwindling reign
of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. More
importantly, both of these empires had important ties
to the area through their twisted and complicated
pasts. The French had been heavily involved with the
Catholic population in Syria for over four hundred
years while Britain hoped to protect India and Egypt
from its imperial rivals (including France and Russia)
through a colony or protectorate in the Middle East.7
Thus the avaricious European giants looked
promisingly toward the future collapse of the Ottoman
Empire. 
Defeating the Turks proved to be a more difficult
task than expected. Even as they directed their eyes
upon the spoils of victory, the British were producing
dismal results in their campaign against the Ottomans
on the beaches of Gallipoli. Soon enough they would
need to reformulate their scheme to defeat the Otto-
mans and inevitably they turned their attention
further East.8 Fearful of another disastrous campaign
resulting in countless more casualties, British strate-
gists sought a military solution utilizing the local
Arabs living under the oppressive Ottoman rule. In
their minds, if they could incite a rebellion amongst
the Arabs they could "paralyze the Ottoman Empire
from within."9 
In early 1914 the British opened discussions with
the ruler of Mecca, Emir Hussein, also known as the
7 Anderson, Lawrence, 151.
      8 Anderson, Lawrence, 150.
      9 Anderson, Lawrence, 142.
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King of Hejaz. Because they were direct descendants of
the Prophet Muhammad, Hussein and his sons could
be used as a tool to unite both Sunnis and Shias in a
revolt.10 Prior to Britain's war with Turkey, it was
Hussein's son Abdullah who had reached out to the
British consulate in Cairo regarding their reaction to
a potential Arab revolt in Hejaz. As Britain eventually
was drawn into the conflict with the Turks, discus-
sions continued over the next two years as both sides
specified their demands.11 Over time these negotiations
were largely carried out through what is now known as
the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. This series of
letters between Hussein and the British High Commis-
sioner in Egypt Henry McMahon centered mainly
around Hussein's desire for an independent Arab state
in the Middle East following his cooperation in defeat-
ing the Turks. While the British badly needed the local
Arab support, they also would not abandon their
imperial ambitions in the region and as a result these
overtures were largely scoffed at and ignored.12 
Negotiations took an abrupt turn however when
Hussein gave the British an ultimatum in October of
1915. At this point Hussein had become increasingly
incensed over Britain's unwillingness to agree to his
terms and gave them thirty days to concede to Arab
independence following the war. If the British declined,
the King of Hejaz informed them that he would sign an
agreement with the Turks who were willing to consent
to his demands in return for his allegiance to Turkey
      10Karabell, Encyclopedia, 2039.
      11 Anderson, Lawrence, 115-116.
      12 Naiden, F.S. "British Scholar - Administrators in Iraq,"
The Journal of the Historical Society. 7, no. 2 (2007) : 185. 
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and Germany in the final years of the war.13 
Britain's foreign ambassadors in the Middle East
were left with an important decision to make. They
could grant Hussein his wishes, abandoning hopes of
any post-war consolation provinces in the Middle East,
while also potentially saving thousands of British lives.
On the other hand, they could decline his offer and
thus turn potential allies into yet another enemy in the
Middle East. In the end, imperial ambitions combined
with political motives forced McMahon to take a
dangerous middle ground.
On October 24th McMahon sent a letter to Hussein
consenting to his conditions in return for his aid in
defeating the Turks. This consent, however, came with
specific modifications, most importantly the demand
by the British that specific regions of Mesopotamia
(coincidentally abundant in oil) be placed under
"special administrative arrangements."14 Moreover,
McMahon also specified that such conditions could
only be upheld with the approval of Britain's ally,
France. Such an addition could only be attributed to
McMahon and his advisors' full knowledge of French
ambitions in Syria and the potential trouble which
could be stirred there following an Allied victory.15
Thus the British had essentially made Hussein a
promise which they would not and could not keep. 
Conscious of these potential diplomatic entangle-
ments the British quickly gauged France's aspirations
for territorial gains in the Middle East. In November,
French ambassadors in London discussed their
      13 Anderson, Lawrence, 142.
      14 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators," 186. 
      15 Anderson, Lawrence, 161-162
104 Historical Perspectives September 2015
determination to take hold of the entire region, includ-
ing Britain's favored regions of Baghdad and Basra.
While the British were certainly lenient towards Syria,
they were clearly not willing to relinquish their claim
to the area of modern day Iraq. With this in mind, the
two empires set out to negotiate an agreement to split
the Middle East between them following the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire. By January 1916 British repre-
sentative Mark Sykes was meeting with Georges-Picot
of France to draw a map which would ultimately
determine the boundaries of the modern day Middle
East.16 With such a massive arrangement determined
by only two men the results were certainly partial.
With Mark Sykes as the British representative in these
discussions the results were catastrophic. As Ander-
son says of Sykes in Lawrence in Arabia, "Few people
in history have so heedlessly caused so much trag-
edy… It’s hard to think of any figure who, with no true
malice intended and neither a nation nor an army at
his disposal, was to wreak more havoc on the twenti-
eth century."17
Mark Sykes: Man of Many Contradictions
In 1916 Mark Sykes was an experienced 36 year
old British imperialist who had traveled the Middle
East extensively and over time had developed a unique
set of opinions on the region. In both his book Dar ul-
Islam and his collection of letters Sykes expresses his
reactions to the religions and identities of the Arabs in
the Middle East. While he was certainly a man full of
racist convictions (T.E. Lawrence would call him "a
      16 Anderson, Lawrence, 162
      17 Anderson, Lawrence, 153-155.
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bundle of prejudices")18 Sykes was for the most part
both tolerant of and fascinated about Islam.19 For him,
religion and politics were “the ultimate interest in
life.”20
On the other hand, his arrogance outweighed his
tolerance and was often reflected in his actions. Sykes
believed he had the power to solve immense problems
with a quick and simple solution and moreover that it
was his duty to use this power. He was both a liar and
a sneak who was incapable of maintaining a steady
opinion: 
Perhaps to be expected given his frenetic pace
and catholic range of interests, Mark Sykes had
a very hard time keeping his facts, even his own
beliefs straight. Impressed by the last person he
had spoken with, or the last idea that had
popped into his fecund mind, he was forever
contradicting positions or policies he had advo-
cated earlier.21
These inconsistencies are reflected throughout his
book Dar ul-Islam and in Mark Sykes: His Life and
Letters, which discribe his travels in the Middle East.
In these works we gain an important glimpse into the
mind of Mark Sykes and his stances towards impor-
tant issues in the Middle East. Throughout the letters
describing his travels he haphazardly stamped labels
      18 Anderson, Lawrence, 115.
      19 Leslie, Shane. Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters, (London, England:
Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1923), 116.
      20 Leslie, Mark Sykes, 116.
      21 Anderson, Lawrence , 155.
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and identities upon ethnic groups from around the
region based simply upon the swift assessment of their
lifestyles and cultural attitudes. Moreover, his dis-
course on Islam was equally ambiguous as he frivo-
lously explored the religion in order to support his own
grandiose religious connections and theories. 
Nevertheless, Sykes understood the divisions
between tribes and religious groups in the region.
Sykes referenced the differences between the Kurds
and their Arab counterparts by proclaiming that “an
Arab of Beirut could not comprehend an Arab of
Mosul.”22 He also asserted that war and violence were
in the fabric of Arabian society.23 Referencing the “six-
thousand year long Bedouin intertribal wars” he
stated:
It is obvious that war was necessary for the
purpose of infusing manliness into the race and
relieving the boredom of the desert, for to be a
dweller therein, with no other occupation than
that of moving from one spot to another, would
produce a race of congenital idiots. It will be
seen, therefore, that a race abhorring manual
labour as degrading, eschewing settled life, and
knowing no other amusements than horseman-
ship and a litde hunting, must be naturally
forced by instinct into war ; but wars of this
kind must necessarily partake more of the
      22 Leslie, Mark Sykes, 110.
      23 Sykes, Mark. Dar ul-Islam, (London, England: Bickers
and Son, 1904), 14.
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nature of a game than a struggle for life and
death.24
Thus he considered most ethnic groups in the Middle
East to be in a stagnant state of development without
the ability to repair themselves.25 More specifically
considering the cultures of Iraq and Syria, he de-
scribed the men of Mosul as those "with the minds of
mudlarks26 and the Kurds as "the simplest and most
gullible of mortals… [their] uninquisitiveness great."27
Simultaneously, he also disliked the Westernization of
Islam and the cities of the region that he had seen in
places such as Tadmur in central Syria.28 
The man who took the Bedouin from their
present state of happiness and purity, and
taught them to be civilised, to be rotted by foul
diseases, to be emasculated by drink, to leave
their tents and herds, to become spies, lawyers,
soldiers, thieves, discontented citizens, million-
aires and prigs, would be committing a crime
crying to heaven for vengeance.29
Sykes’ views on Arab people and culture varied from
city to city as he tried to piece together an encompass-
ing vision for the diverse and complex region. These
      24 Sykes, Dar ul-Islam, 14.
      25 Leslie, Mark Sykes, 88.
      26 Leslie, Mark Sykes, 94.
      27 Leslie, Mark Sykes, 109.
      28 Sykes, Dar ul-Islam, 20.
      29 Sykes, Dar ul-Islam, 16.
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methods of generalizations and simple solutions would
unfortunately also dominate his negotiations with 
Picot. This was also the same man who believed the
British were "destined to be the masters of Turkey" as
he described its treasures and missed opportunities.30
He determined the Arabs to be unable to govern
themselves, describing them further as "unamenable
to civilization."31 Therefore, while Sykes opposed the
Westernization of the Middle East, he encouraged the
British Empire to harness its vast resources through
the careful manipulation of the local Arab tribes. 
These ideas combined with his charm and practical
knowledge convinced many British operatives in the
Middle East of the effectiveness of his imperialist
policies. His experience and cunning earned him an
appointment as an advisor to the de Bunsen Commit-
tee guiding British policy in the Middle East.32 With his
influence growing, Sykes seemed like the obvious
choice at the time to dictate the terms that Britain
would settle with France over the future of the Middle 
East. By the beginning of 1916 he had been chosen by
his peers to meet with French ambassador François
Georges-Picot to discuss the map of the future of the
Middle East.33
The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916
French Ambassador Georges-Picot held many of the
same racial and imperialist prejudices which had
      30 Leslie, Mark Sykes, 114.
      31 Leslie, Mark Sykes, 89.
      32 Anderson, Lawrence, 153.
      33 Anderson, Lawrence, 155.
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landed Sykes at the negotiation table.34 Additionally,
he had the backing of a French state which was
prepared to drive a hard bargain, demanding at the
very least to maintain their influence in Syria and
Lebanon. Thus the discussions between the two were
competitive and fueled by the deep seated hubris and
imperious tendencies.35 
As expected, the negotiations could not go on
without some deception on behalf of Sykes. While
Sykes was privileged to the information involving the
McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the subse-
quent promises made, he decided to withhold this
knowledge from Georges-Picot.36 Naturally, such a
decision played a major role in how the negotiations
played out as the French maintained their lofty expec-
tations without any familiarity with the agreement with
the Arabs.
Through these muddled imperial discussions the
Sykes-Picot Agreement was created. In the treaty the
British would take Basra and have administrative
control over Baghdad while the French would take
Lebanon, Syria and Mosul (Sykes said of the Kurds,
"let the French try to deal with them"37) with adminis-
trative control over the central region of Syria. This
small region on the modern border of Syria and Iraq
was what would constitute the "independent" Arab
Kingdom promised in the McMahon-Hussein Corre-
spondence. These small areas, because of their "inabil-
      34 Anderson, Lawrence, 163.
      35 Anderson, Lawrence, 162.
      36 Anderson, Lawrence, 163.
      37 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators," 186. 
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ity to govern themselves," would essentially be British
and French vassal states.38 With this agreement, the
"special arrangements" were designed so that Arab
protectorates would be created under the administra-
tion of the British and the French.39 
This map, as can be seen below in Figure A, repre-
sents a complete failure to consider the desires and
cultural boundaries of the people of the Middle East.
It is a map drawn completely on the basis of imperial-
ist geographic and resource-driven motives with
complete disregard for the ethnic and social bound-
aries of the area. Finally, and most importantly, this
map entirely neglected the promises made to the King
of Hejaz and relegated his portion to only a small share
of central Syria under the control of the French. 40
      38 Anderson, Lawrence , 163.
      39 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 186.
      40 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 186.
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Of course, with this agreement nothing was entirely
official. The Arab Revolt still had yet to begin and the
Ottoman Empire was still no closer to being defeated
than before. But what the Sykes-Picot Agreement did
was create a map, and this map became the precedent
for British and French imperial projections of the
Middle East in the post-war treaty negotiations. With
the creation of the League of Nations' mandate system
and the passage of subsequent agreements the Sykes-
Picot boundary lines would more or less come to
represent the borders of the modern day Middle East.41
In the immediate aftermath of the negotiations, the
agreement remained secret in order to quell the
potential political reaction which such an imperialist
initiative would create. This changed with the fall of
the Tsarist Russian Empire in late 1917 as the war
was grinding towards a conclusion. While the Russian
partitions were forgotten as a result of the 1917
Revolution and subsequent turmoil, the Bolsheviks'
decision to release the secret treaty to the public
ignited a massive campaign for self-determination
amongst the British Arabists. 
These British Arabists were the special young
brand of English men and women who had a combina-
tion of compassion for and fascination in the Arab
cause. While Ronald Storrs dubbed it “the Arab Move-
ment”42 as it gained momentum in the post-war
political excitement, Mark Sykes had a more pessimis-
tic view of these young English foreign agents:[On the
selection and training of those young English-men who
are destined to serve their country in the East as
      41 Karabell, Encyclopedia, 2128.
      42 Alaric, "The British Arabists," 323.
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either its representatives or its administrators] ...
appears to me most open to criticism, the selection
being based entirely on competitive examinations,
which can in no case afford any test of such important
qualities as imagination, style, or personality, even if
they were made to hinge more upon a knowledge of the
languages, religions, and history of the East, and less
on natural science, mathematics, and political econ-
omy ; which latter things, though all very well in their
way, appear to me to be of quite secondary importance
for the understanding of the character and idiosyncra-
sies of Eastern peoples, by which alone one would
have thought it would be possible to govern them with
tact, discretion, and sagacity.43Sykes was conscious of
the sympathies for the Arabs held by the British
Arabists and clearly felt threatened by the superiority
of their knowledge and experience in the Middle East.
More importantly, he understood their views on the
assurances made to the Arabs in the agreement struck
in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and how
they clashed with his own map of the Middle East.
Sykes was rightfully anxious as the same men and
women who planned the Arab Revolt now hoped to
fulfill the promises made to the Arabs in their agree-
ment to commence it.
T.E. Lawrence: The Map Driven Optimist
Among them of course was T.E. Lawrence, an
important figure because of his involvement in the
Arab Revolt. Lawrence's story has been sensationalized
over the years through both his own memoirs in The
Seven Pillars as well as in David Lean's depiction of
      43 Sykes, Dar ul-Islam, xii.
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Lawrence in the 1962 film Lawrence of Arabia. The
first man to popularize Lawrence's story was American
filmmaker and journalist Lowell Thomas who encoun-
tered Lawrence in Jerusalem during the Arab Revolt.
Thomas' film, photos and lectures on Lawrence in-
trigued audiences across America and Europe and
made Lawrence a household name as well as drew
further attention to the Arab cause.44 
While Lawrence's popularity through his drama-
tized story gave him some weight in public perceptions
of negotiations, he was also vastly experienced in the
affairs of the Middle East. He had worked in the Cairo
Intelligence Bureau studying maps for an extended
period of time while also gaining valuable experience
throughout the region and ultimately specializing
mainly in Syrian affairs.45 Most importantly, Lawrence
had good relationships with Hussein and his sons
Abdullah and especially Faisal, whom he had worked
alongside in the Arab Revolt.46 These connections
would be essential in his projection of the future of the
Middle East.
 What Lawrence envisioned was a Syria and Iraq
split between three Arab Kingdoms, one for each of
Hussein's sons while Hussein himself remained the
King of Hejaz. Abdullah would rule Lower Mesopota-
mia, Zeid Upper Mesopotamia and Faisal would rule
Syria.47 Lawrence did not sympathize with the French
ambitions because they had not fought anywhere near
      44 Alaric, “The British Arabists,” 323.
      45 Anderson, Lawrence, 192.
      46 Anderson, Lawrence, 208.
      47 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 190.
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Figure B: T.E. Lawrence’s Map
the Middle East during the war; instead he called for
"Syria independent under Faisal: it [the Arab “nation”]
has fought for it [Syria], and deserves preferential
treatment."48 The map which Lawrence presented
before the de Bunsen Committee in 1918 can be seen
below in Figure B with sections 3, 4, and 5 represent-
ing the independent Arab kingdoms.49 50
While Lawrence’s projection of the Middle East
was certainly more rational and calculated than
Sykes’, it still reflected some of his own gaps in under-
standing of the region. Lawrence recognized the ethnic
boundaries between the Turks and Armenians of the
North and granted their independence in sections 1
      48 Malcolm Brown and T.E. Lawrence. The Letters of T.E.
Lawrence, (London, England: J.M Dent & Sons Limited, 1988),
162.
      49 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 190.
      50 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 190.
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and 2 of his map.51 However, Lawrence failed to grant
the same autonomy to the “blustering” Kurdish groups
around Mosul whom he held a “wary respect for.”52
Instead, Lawrence was convinced of the optimistic
British belief that Hussein and his sons could unite
the Arab people under their leadership. Without an in-
depth understanding of Iraq and it’s predominantly
Shi’a population, he believed both the Kurds and the
wealthy elite of Baghdad would submit to Hussein’s
Sunni rule. In drawing the boundaries of the Middle
East himself, Lawrence’s map was therefore still both
imperial and inaccurate, albeit much less-so than the
one created by Sykes. 
Gertrude Bell: The Nationalist Idealist
Lawrence was thus fortunate to have worked
with Gertrude Bell, the British expert in Iraq at the
time. The first woman to complete the requirements for
a first-class degree in History at Oxford,53 Bell, whose
writings on the region had gained some solid traction
in Europe, was an experienced traveler in the Middle
East. "The East was undoubtedly Gertrude's home"
and in 1915 she was called to Cairo in order to assist
in the formation of British policy in the East.54 By the
end of the year she had compiled a functional "who's
who" of the Middle East, cataloguing the tribes and
      51 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 190.
      52 Anderson, Lawrence, 40.
      53Brown and Lawrence. Letters, 36.
      54 Burgoyne, Elizabeth. Gertrude Bell: From Her Personal
Papers, 1914-1926, (London,      England:Ernest Benn, 1961),
30.
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religious affiliations of the Arabs.55 This directory
would be used throughout Britain's administration in
the Middle East in the 1920s. 
Following the war Bell was sent to London
where she would "make a solid bloc of Near Eastern-
ers, including Mr. Lawrence, and present a united
opinion" arguing the case for Arab self-determination.56
Compared to Lawrence, Bell originally sought a much
less direct solution to the Arab issue. While Lawrence
hoped to distinctly draw the borders of the Arab
kingdoms, Bell initially hoped to sit back and wait for
an Arab nationalist movement to arise.57 Unlike
Lawrence, Bell was not necessarily convinced that
Hussein or either of his sons could unite the whole of
an Arab nation based solely on inheritance and instead
insisted that a nationalist movement should give way
to a class of "professional politicians of Baghdad" to
carry the region forward.58
Her apprehension stemmed from an under-
standing of the complicated nature of the region's
ethnic and religious disputes. Bell was wary of the
Shi'a majority in Iraq and the potential backlash which
would ensue if they refused to accept Hussein. More-
over, she recognized that the delicate nature of the
situation of the Kurds could not be solved easily.
Finally, Bell considered the minorities of the region,
including Christians in Mosul as well as "whole men of
wealth and position, of whatever creed" who would
      55 Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell,  31.
      56 Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 108.
      57 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 193. 
      58 Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 106.
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object to the installment of an outright Sunni King.59
Instead Bell hoped that a temporary British adminis-
tration could foster the establishment of a national
movement of Arabs not dependent upon ethnic or
religious barriers.
Such a national movement proved impossible
after the publication of the Sykes-Picot document by
the Bolsheviks in 1917. This coupled, with the inclu-
sion of Sharif Faisal at the Paris Peace Conference as
a representative of an independent Arab State, in-
censed local minority groups and created anti-British
sympathies in Baghdad and Mosul.60 These "prema-
ture" national movements instead replaced the all-
encompassing one Bell hoped would come in the
following years and forced her hand. Bell was mindful
both of the Arab dependence on the British and the
potential backlash this could create: "It's an open
question whether we don't do these people more harm
than good and one still feels more despairing about it
now that our civilization has broken down so com-
pletely. But we can't leave them alone, they won't be
left alone anyway."61 
It is important at this point to stop and recog-
nize the imperial ambitions of both Lawrence and Bell.
While they were promoting policies of independence
and autonomy in the region, these were still Western
backed strategies which were derived from Western
notions of the “nation” and “state.” Lawrence’s and
Bell’s calls for the British Empire to remove itself from
the region reflected their motivations to serve the best
      59 Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 106.
      60Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 106.
      61Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 48
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interests of the Empire itself rather than the people of
the region. In their eyes, the Middle East was much too
diverse and complex for the British to maintain any
profitable presence over time. As described in the
above selection from Gertrude Bell’s “Speech on Self-
Determination in Mesopotamia”62 in 1917, the Sykes-
Picot Agreement and its shocking revelation to the
public effectively drew the British Empire into a
situation in which it must preserve its presence in the
region in order to protect both its own interests as well
as those of the local populations. With no other
options, Bell was drawn to Lawrence's idea of inde-
pendent Arab kingdoms. The French quickly declined
any interest in Mosul and the British eventually
secured the city, causing Lawrence and Bell to refor-
mulate Lawrence’s original map into one single Arab
Kingdom. If the French were consigned to having the
whole of Syria, the least Lawrence and Bell could do
was create an independent Arab Kingdom in Iraq.63
Bell sought to create the national movement she had
envisioned by facilitating the establishment of an Iraqi
National Museum to inspire the formation of an Iraqi
nation under the British mandate.64  
Time wore on and the dust settled on the peace
conference while the League of Nations established the
mandate system. As the local populations rebelled
against British administration by June 1920, the
creation of Iraq became a more possible objective. The
British, keen to maintain their influence in the region,
would promote their interests through a Royal Air
      62Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 48.
      63 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 194. 
      64 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 194. 
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object to the installment of an outright Sunni King.59
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      59 Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 106.
      60Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 106.
      61Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 48
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Force base in Mesopotamia by “administering the
country as though it were part of India.”65 Faisal,
forced out of Syria by the French, would eventually be
crowned the King of Iraq. Desperate to achieve national
unity, Lawrence and Bell toured the country with
Faisal but because he was not native to the region
Faisal was unable to foster unanimous national
support.66 
Thus neither Lawrence's imaginative map of
three kingdoms nor Bell's map drawn by an Arab
national movement was achieved. The boundaries of
modern day Iraq and Syria were instead drawn accord-
ing to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The map
based upon imperial ambitions had outweighed the
maps based upon aspirations for independent Arab
nations. More importantly, the final boundaries
completely disregarded the promises made to the
Arabs in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.
Modern Perspectives
With the failures of the Sykes-Picot boundaries
evident today, there is still a movement to envision a
map of the Middle East more aligned with the ethnic
and religious differences which permeate the region.
As Ross Douthat says, many current observers are
drawing prospective maps of the Middle East in the
hope to best define its way into the future:Every so
often, in the post-9/11 era, an enterprising observer
circulates a map of what the Middle East might look
like, well, after: after America’s wars in the region,
after the various revolutions and counterrevolutions,
      65 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 196. 
      66 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 194. 
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after the Arab Spring and the subsequent springtime
for jihadists, after the Sunni-Shiite struggle for mas-
tery. At some point, these cartographers suggest, the
wave of post-9/11 conflict will necessarily redraw
borders, reshape nation-states, and rub out some of
the lines drawn by Sir Mark Sykes and François
Georges-Picot in a secret Anglo-French treaty almost
100 years ago.67.Now, with the rise of powerful militant
groups in the region, .there is an effort being con-
ducted by both foreigners.and local populations. The
actions undertaken by ISIS reflect this endeavor to
redraw the map of the Middle East based upon Arab
conceptions. 
This rejection of the Sykes-Picot map and
borders could only be seen as inevitable as the situa-
tion in the Middle East deteriorated over the past two
decades. As English politician Paddy Ashdown writes,
What is happening in the Middle East, like it or
not, is the wholesale rewriting of the Sykes-
Picot borders of 1916 in favour of an Arab world
whose shapes will be arbitrated more by reli-
gious dividing lines than the old imperial conve-
niences of 100 years ago.” The difficult situation
for Western countries is to find the middle
ground between accepting the demolition of the
Iraqi state and denouncing the violence brought
upon it by ISIS. While the former is inevitable,
the latter is unacceptable in the modern
geopolitical climate. Therefore from a Western
perspective our actions in the Middle East today
      67 Douthat, Ross. “The End of Iraq: Changing Maps in the
Mideast.” The New York Times, (New York, NY), June 14, 2014.
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are simply making up for our imperialist mis-
takes of the past. We must help usher in a new
and stabilized Arabic state while also defending
it from the militant extremism which has domi-
nated its recent history. “None of this will be
easy, of course. But better, surely, to face up to
the realities of the post-Sykes-Picot Middle East
and influence it where we can, than lose the
moment standing impotently by, hoping that
yesterday will come back again.68 
ISIS and Sykes-Picot
If one looks at the map describing the ongoing
conflict involving ISIS in Syria and Iraq today (Figure
C) they will find striking connections to the negotia-
tions between McMahon and Hussein. The Islamic
State has established a perimeter stretching from
Falluja through Haditha and Mosul across the border
of Syria and Iraq to Aleppo and Kobani on the border
of Turkey. They have reclaimed the areas originally
promised to Arab independence by Sykes-Picot in the
center of Syria and have expanded beyond the borders
of Syria and Iraq established in the agreement. As a
whole, ISIS seeks to create the Sunni Islamic-Arab
State promised in the McMahon-Hussein Correspon-
dence a hundred years ago and expand beyond it into
a worldwide caliphate in revenge for the past.69 70
      68 Ashdown, Paddy. “Western Intervention Over ISIS Won’t
Prevent the Breakup of Iraq.” The Guardian, (London, England),
August 14th, 2014.
      69 Worth, “Redrawn Lines, ” 2014. 
      70 P.J.W. “State of Terror.” The Economist, (London,
England), June 16th, 2014. 
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Figure C: The Campaign of ISIS
This rapid rise and success of ISIS reflects the
repercussions of the inadequacies of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement of 1916. The militant extremists have taken
control of areas that were controversial in the dispute
between Sykes and the British Arabists. While ISIS has
retaken the desert areas in central Syria and Iraq, it
has also taken the contested city of Mosul in Northern
Iraq. Just as the question of Mosul was avoided during
the Sykes-Picot negotiations because of its diverse
demographics and political sensitivities, the city was
targeted by ISIS as an area of interest for political
expansion as well as the ethnic cleansing of Kurds and
other opposition groups. The mixed population made
integration easier for the militants as many residents
were initially welcoming in reaction to their disagree-
ments with the Shia-dominant Iraqi government.71 
      71 Worth, “Redrawn Lines,” 2014. 
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Moreover, the group with the fiercest opposition
to ISIS in the region is known as the Peshmerga. This
group of well-trained military units is composed of
Turkish and Iraqi Kurds in opposition to the extremist
policies and ethnic cleansing of ISIS. The Kurds are
fighting for autonomy and the recognition of a Kurdish
state in the areas of Northern Iraq and Syria. The
Kurdish quest for autonomy stems from Sykes-Picot's
ignorance about ethnic barriers of the region. Thus the
two major forces fighting in the Middle East today are
both motivated by the ineffectiveness of the Sykes-
Picot Agreement.72 
The question is whether the maps drawn by
Lawrence and Bell would have effectively avoided such
massive religious and ethnic conflicts. While Law-
rence's map would have created the single Arab
Kingdom which ISIS fights for, it also disregarded the
complicated nature of many tribal relationships in the
region. On the other hand, Bell’s embrace of an Arab
nationalist movement would have potentially fostered
the creation of a nation centered around a charismatic
leader rather than one based on religious diversity and
support. While the boundaries drawn by their joint
opinions may have been more sympathetic to the
wishes of the Arab population, they still would have
been perceived as imperialist by many in the local
populations and would likely have been rejected as
foreign duplicity. Ultimately, because of the ineffectual
boundaries established by Sykes-Picot, these ideas for
an autonomous Middle East were disregarded; and we
will never know which map might have been more
successful in creating and maintaining harmony in the
      72 Worth, “Redrawn Lines,” 2014. 
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diverse region.  Instead, we are faced with the
reality of a region which has been plagued by political
and religious disputes and periods of violence for
nearly one hundred years. Because of the imperial
ambitions of Mark Sykes and the obstinate stance of
France in the region of Syria, the borders of the Middle
East projected by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916
were futile in helping to produce a condition of stabil-
ity in the region. Conversely, they ignored the self-
determining sympathies of the British Arabists such as
T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, which could have
potentially brought congruity to the Middle East. Had
a more functional map been created by a mixture of
British Arabists with the input of major Arab ethnic
groups, many of the inconsistencies of Sykes’ map may
have been avoided. In the end, the follies of Mark
Sykes in establishing the map of the modern day
Middle East have brought constant upheaval and
turbulence to the region which is now being exacer-
bated by the violent actions of extremist groups such
as the ‘Islamic State’.  
Nicholas Comaratta graduated in 2015 with a major in
History.  He was initiated into Phi Alpha Theta in 2015.
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